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Abstract
A decision support system was designed for
naval shipboard command-level decision-
makers to enhance decisionmaking in a lit-
toral environment or in any short-fused,
ambiguous, decisionmaking situation. De-
sign of the prototype DSS was based on (1)
an understanding of the cognitive strategies
people bring to bear when dealing with the
types of decisions requir-ed in tactical deci-
sionmaking, (2) applying human-system in-
terface design principles which are ex-
pected to help compensate for human cog-
nitive processing limitations, and (3) the ex-
tensive involvement of subject matter ex-
perts with vast command decisionmaking
experience. Each DSS module will be de-
scribed in terms of what decision/s it is de-
signed to support.
1  Introduction
The decision support system (DSS) was devel-
oped for the command-level decisionmakers
within a Navy combat information center—the
commanding officer and the tactical action officer.
These two officers are responsible for the follow-
ing combat-related decisions: (1) recognizing and
correctly interpreting the nature of the threat; (2)
predicting which preplanned responses and/or
countermeasures may be effective if the situation
evolves in
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certain ways; and (3) interpreting information to
determine whether the situation actually is evolv-
ing a particular way. An additional task is to en-
sure that team members  provide critical informa-
tion that would enable the team to resolve ambi-
guities. The six modules which comprise the DSS
were designed to facilitate the decisionmakers'
performance of the tasks listed above and, in gen-
eral, promote an accurate situation awareness
while minimizing the decision-maker's cognitive
processing requirements.
This paper is intended as a companion paper
to the papers on principles for aiding complex
military decisionmaking (Hutchins, Morrison, &
Kelly, 1996) and the empirical evaluation of the
decision support system (Kelly, Hutchins, & Mor-
rison, 1996). Topics to be discussed include the
functionality of the six decision support modules
and the differences between existing tactical sys-
tems and the DSS developed under the Tactical
Decision-Making Under Stress (TADMUS) pro-
gram. These differences include (1) the presenta-
tion of synthesized data to support critical sub-
tasks; (2) constructing explan-ations for the avail-
able evidence; (3) evaluating the plausibility of
hypotheses regarding the situation; (4) providing
the ability to compare multiple hypotheses; (5)
processing and presenting infor-mation in a for-
mat that parallels the decision-maker’s cognitive
strategies; (6) prompting the user regarding re-
quired responses; and (7) providing a better map-
ping between the geograph-ical display of data
and alerts. In addition, one of the unique aspects
of the TADMUS program at NRaD has been the
extensive involvement of subject matter experts
(SMEs). These SMEs have vast command deci-
sionmaking experience as well as an understand-
ing of current Navy procedures and capabilities
across relevant tactical scenarios.
1.1  Status and Command Displays
All modules included in the DSS are what are re-
ferred to as “status” displays, as opposed to
“command” displays, in the human factors liter-
ature (viz., Andre & Wickens, 1992). A command
display tells the user what to do without display-
ing the reasons for the command. Status displays
include the “why” information, informing the user
regarding what is known about the current situa-
tion. A separate, yet related, idea is that informa-
tion is not filtered. User’s who participated in
subjective evaluation studies of earlier versions of
the DSS indicated they wanted to have access to
the raw data when making decisions to engage
(Rummel, 1995). All modules were developed to
support the decisionmaker in performing the req-
uisite tasks without removing the user from the
decisionmaking process. Hence, raw data can be
displayed when requested for any contact.
Research indicates that providing decision
support in the form of status displays increases the
accuracy of comprehending system states (i.e.,
situation awareness). Andre and Wickens attribut-
ed the superior performance of subjects with a
status aid as resulting from negating the decision-
maker’s need to “traverse the display processing
stages in the reverse order (i.e., from a com-
manded response to a cognitive interpretation),”
which is required of the user with the command
type display. The analogy in the TADMUS DSS
situation is the decisionmaker would want to
mentally create a list of reasons, or a checklist, for
why the track ought to be engaged before issuing
the “engage” command. The severity of the results
in the decisions to be made demands that the user
have the ability to verify the accuracy of the rec-
ommended action (Crocoll and Coury, 1990).
Several modules included in the DSS incorporate
elements of both types of displays. This is best
illustrated in the response manager which is de-
scribed in section 2.1.3.
2  Decision Support System Description
Currently available decision support systems typi-
cally provide indications of the presence of vari-
ous data items and their values. Indications of the
relations between features, structural similar-ity
between sequences of features, or evidence of un-
derlying relationships among features is usually
not depicted. The TADMUS decision support
tools were designed to provide precisely these
types of evidence. All of the DSS modules focus
on providing information to the user in a manner
that will support situation awareness. These mod-
ules will be discussed in terms of the underlying
theoretical concepts and in terms of the expected
payoff for each decision support tool.
The experimental DSS receives tactical data
input from many sources, integrates the data to
present a synthesized picture, and displays it in
various ways for aiding individual subtasks. (This
tactical data is inserted directly into the DSS from
the scenario generator in the Decision-Making
Evaluation Facility for Tactical Teams Laboratory
where this research was conducted. This informa-
tion would come from the various sensor systems
found aboard ship in the operational application of
DSS.)
2.1  Decision Support System Modules
The prototype DSS comprises the six display
modules shown in Figure 1. These modules are
arranged according to an increasing level of in-
formation complexity from top to bottom of the
display. The top half of the display contains the
track summary (upper left corner), track history,
and the response manager modules. (The track
history module occupies the rectangle in the upper
right-hand corner and the circular display below
track summary in the upper left. These two areas
present different views of the same information
and are thus considered as one module.) These
three modules focus on analysis and identification
of a single contact and would be used to make a
quick shoot/no-shoot decision.
The lower half of the display presents the ba-
sis for assessment, comparison to normal values,
and the track priority listing and alerts modules.
Basis for assessment and the comparison to nor-
mal values modules provide more detailed analy-
sis of a single contact while the alerts and track
priority listing (bottom of the display) presents
information on all contacts currently requiring at-
tention or action.
2.1.1  Track Summary
Track summary presents current data for a se-
lected track (bearing, range, course, speed,
Figure 1.  Decision Support System Developed for the TADMUS Program.
altitude, etc.) but with an improved human-
computer interface format. As shown in Figure 2,
all data items are appropriately labeled and
aligned to facilitate extraction of key parameters
by the user. Subjects who participated in the em-
pirical evaluation of the DSS remarked that the
information was much easier to read in this for-
mat. An additional item included in this module is
the DSS assessment, that is, whether the track is
considered a threat or a non-threat.
Figure 2.  Track Summary Module.
2.1.2  Track History
When a rapid decision is required regarding
whether the track should be engaged, the track
history and response manager modules should
present useful assistance in two ways:  by facili-
tating the decisionmakers' use of a recognitional
strategy when developing a threat assessment (via
track history) and by assisting the decisionmaker
in performing the requisite actions. For tasks in-
volving rapid decisionmaking (e.g., several sec-
onds to one or two minutes) a recognitional strat-
egy appears to be highly efficient (Klein, 1993).
The track history module, depicted in Figure 3,
was designed to support the recognition-primed
decision (RPD) model of decisionmaking. To
generate a reasonable course of action, the deci-
sionmaker must accurately identify familiar ele-
ments in the situation. The objective for this mod-
ule is to facilitate the track identification process
by providing information that is integrated in a
way that supports a recognitional decision strat-
egy. The track history module presents a highly
synthesized view of the situation regarding a spe-
cific track.
The track history module depicts a track’s
speed, altitude, course and range on a two-
dimensional graphical display along with a geo-
metric representation of both the track’s worst
case weapon release envelope and own-ship’s
weapons coverage. A large amount of parametric
data is portrayed graphically for rapid assimilation
by the user. The track history module is designed
to be used when the decisionmaker has to make a
rapid shoot/no-shoot decision. Changes in the
track’s speed, course, altitude or range are imme-
diately apparent with this graphical depiction of
the track history. This graphical representation
was hypothesized to be particularly useful, as in
previous systems the user had to remember the
previous parameter values (e.g., speed, altitude)
and compare them with the current values for
those parameters. However, as short-term memory
degrades under stress, the user may not be able to
accurately perform this function.
2.1.3  Response Manager
The response manager, depicted in Figure 4,  pro-
vides assistance in using preplanned responses.
This decision support module was designed spe-
cifically to mitigate errors document-ed in previ-
ous research (Hutchins & Kowalski, 1993;
Hutchins & Westra, 1995). The response manager
was developed to provide support to the user re-
garding required actions and when they need to be
taken, and to lesson the task load imposed on the
user's limited attentional resources during high
track density. Maintaining an awareness of the
status of each track and the status of many actions
to be taken by the CIC team (e.g., issuing warn-
ings, illuminating with radar, executing electronic
support measures
Figure 3.  Track History Module.
packages, verifying airspace, readying self-
defense systems, making reports to the battle
group commander, etc.)—as well as what the
track's response to these various actions were—
severely taxes the decisionmaker's working
memory.During TADMUS baseline experiments, the
majority of documented errors involved errors of
Figure 4.   Response Manager Module.
omission, e.g., failure to take defensive measures,
and failure to adhere to rules of engagement
(ROE). The cause of these failures to take re-
quired actions is, in many cases, attributed to the
extremely high task demands levied on the deci-
sionmaker by the scenario. The scenarios were
intentionally developed to be highly stressful (al-
beit realistic) by including high levels of ambigu-
ity, workload, and time-pressure. The phenome-
non that increasing stress leads to decreasing
working memory is well documented (e.g.,
Hockey, 1986).  Effective maintenance of the
queue of pending tasks requires considerable cog-
nitive effort.
Competent management of the task constella-
tion requires that the decisionmaker respond to
each task, ideally at the most efficient possible
moment, or minimally before it is too late. This
requires the person to stay abreast of the urgen-
cies, opportunities, and constraints on all of the
tasks. The response manager module graphically
depicts preplanned responses which need to be
taken regarding a selected track, using a series of
bars (on a range scale) that show the earliest and
latest time each action can be taken to be effec-
tive. This module also depicts the track’s current
speed and range via a moving pointer that indi-
cates where the track is in relation to the various
actions which need to be taken. The response
manager module thus cues the decision-maker to
take actions specified by the ROE or ship's battle
orders. Color coding is used to keep track of
which actions have been taken and which actions
remain to be taken.
2.1.3.1  Example of Integrated Command and Status
Display
Within each bar the action to be taken is listed
(such as, execute EW packages), which represents
the command type of information.  This module
also depicts the track’s current speed and range
via a moving pointer that indicates where the track
is in relation to the various actions which need to
be taken. This synthesized representation of kine-
matic information thus presents the “why” infor-
mation:  “this track is now at a range where
chaff/jamming/etc. would be effective.” The goal
is not to subject the decisionmaker to a “checklist
mentality” where individual initiative has been
removed, but to have the response manager act as
an “intelligent” assistant, keeping track of actions
taken and suggesting future actions in a timely
manner.
2.1.4  Basis for Assessment
Basis for assessment, depicted in Figure 5, is
based on a model of a cognitive strategy employed
in making decisions where the decisionmaker is
confronted with a situation involving contradic-
tory or incomplete information. In this situation,
the decisionmaker constructs a causal model
which explains the available evidence. This strat-
egy is known as explanation-based reasoning, or
story generation (Pennington & Hastie, 1993). In
this approach, available data are assembled into
explanatory structures, with one structure for each
possible conclusion. Each of the explanations at-
tempts to explain how every piece of data can be
accounted for in support of each conclusion, even
though some of the data items would naturally
contradict reaching some conclusions. Contradic-
tory data are explained through the use of internal
assumptions.  It is assumed that there are a fixed
number of predefined possible conclusions and
each data item points directly to one of those pos-
sible conclusions.
2.1.4.1  Avoiding Decision Biases
Basis for assessment, shown in Figure 5, pro-
vides a contact threat assessment and presents all
the information used to form the assessment. Ba-
sis for assessment will usually generate multiple
hypotheses to explain the available evidence be-
cause many of the contacts behave in a way that
makes determining whether they are a threat or
non-threat very difficult due to the
Figure 5.  Basis for Assessment.
inherent ambiguity in the scenarios. In addition to
reflecting a naturalistic decision strategy based on
explanation-based reasoning, this decision support
module should have the corollary benefit of re-
ducing decision bias. Human decisionmakers have
been shown to be deficient in generating alterna-
tives. Specifically, in situation assessment they
tend to generate only a few hypotheses based on
early data and find it difficult to enlarge their hy-
pothesis set, even in the face of contradictory data
(Tolcott, 1991). Basis for assessment presents all
the supporting evidence, counter-evidence, and
assumptions the decision-maker would need to
make to accept the presented hypothesis (that is,
threat or non-threat). The advantage is that the de-
cisionmaker should be less susceptible to many of
the typical biases which are well documented in
the decisionmaking literature, such as, "availabil-
ity" bias, "confirmation" bias, effects of "fram-
ing," etc. (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982). By pre-
senting all available evidence in a structured way,
grouped under the three evidence categories men-
tioned above, the decisionmaker is less likely to
make a decision based on a subset of the available
evidence. The decisionmaker will also be made
explicitly aware of the absence of data which may
be as important as the presence of data. For exam-
ple, when studying Army intelligence analysts, it
was found that the confirmation bias could be re-
duced by displays that made explicit the uncer-
tainties about enemy unit locations (Tolcott and
Marvin, 1988). In research conducted to investi-
gate whether Navy decisionmakers responding to
antiair warfare scenarios would be susceptible to
these biases, the results supported earlier research
findings. A study was designed to assess whether
naval personnel, trained and experienced in antiair
operations, exhibit biases when performing their
normal duties. Results strongly supported exis-
tence of the availability, representativeness, con-
trast, and confirmation biases in the surface antiair
warfare context (Barnett, Perrin, and Walrath,
1993). Threat assessment should help ameliorate
the effects of these pervasive biases.
2.1.4.2  Avoiding "Blue-on Blue" Engagements
A second advantage of the threat assessment
module is it should reduce the occurrence of
"blue-
on-blue" incidents (fratricide) where a decision-
maker mistakenly identifies a friendly contact as
an enemy.  By pointing out the counter-evidence
associated with a particular threat assessment
category and listing the assumptions one has to
"buy into" to accept the conclusion that the con-
tact is a threat the decisionmaker may be better
able to weigh all the information about a contact
and reach a more accurate assessment regarding
its threat potential.
2.1.5  Comparison to Normal Values
Comparison to normal values, depicted in fig-
ure 6, compares known information about a con-
tact with information representative of specific
types of contacts. The comparison to normal val-
ues module was designed to support the user in
performing feature matching. Klein and associates
(Klein, 1993) found feature matching to be the
predominant cognitive strategy used by decision-
makers when performing situation assessment.
The decisionmaker matches the features of the
present situation with a template, or mental
model, of a previous situation. Comparison to
normal values presents a comparison of data asso-
ciated with the selected contact with exemplars
for other types of contacts (i.e., threat or non-
threat) and graphically depicts whether the se-
lected contact is a fit or misfit with these catego-
ries. Discrete coding of key variables is used to
determine whether a contact's data falls within the
specific ranges that categorize threat versus non-
threat.
Figure 6.  Comparison to Normal Values.
2.1.6  Track Priority Listing and Alerts
The track priority listing and alerts, depicted
in Figure 7, summarizes key information on all
system contacts in order of tactical priority and
allows the user to monitor more than one contact.
This module presents multiple contact informa-
tion, focusing on high priority contacts, the next
action to be taken and status of that action, (e.g.,
immediate, watch, low priority), the last alert
given regarding the contact and the time it was
given, and an alert history function. The user can
click on the last alert to view a history window
which displays all previous alerts received re-
garding this contact. Alerts are based on preset
criteria for key events and required responses.
Lines included in this decision support module are
ordered by the operational priority assigned to the
corresponding contact. Users could check what
the DSS listed as tracks requiring immediate at-
tention to make sure they had not failed to attend
to any critical track/s. Then, if they questioned the
DSS’s recommendation, they might look at the
basis for assessment to determine why the DSS
considered that track a high priority.
One type of tactically significant error ob-
served during early TADMUS experiments was a
failure to attend to a contact of interest (Hutchins,
Morrison, & Kelly, 1996). This is attributed to the
high workload imposed by the ambiguous con-
tacts, and very limited time that decisionmakers
have to process contacts. The track priority listing
and alerts was designed to
Figure 7.  Track Priority Listing and Alerts.
ensure that the user is made aware of new contacts
of interest and their status. This module will
prompt the user on required actions and specify
when these actions are to be taken. The behavior
that triggered the last alert is also presented along
with the capability to review the history of alerts
for any selected contact.
3  Decision Support System Features
In summary, key features of the prototype DSS
include the ability to:
•   Track multiple hypotheses
•   Present patterns of tactical activities
•   Develop explanations for observed events
•   Evaluate plausibility of explanations
•   Use graphics to support intuitive processes 
and reduce cognitive processing requirements
•    Prompt user regarding appropriate responses
•    Support the decisionmaker's cognitive process
4  Conclusions
The TADMUS program has produced a prototype
DSS which has been empirically evalu-ated as
significantly improving the decisionmaking per-
formance of experienced officers (Kelly, Morri-
son, and Hutchins, 1996). Feedback received from
these officers has been very positive with sugges-
tions made for significant improvements. Several
unanticipated advantages were revealed during
evaluation of the DSS. One of these advantages
included having continuous access to data that
would not be available with current systems. For
example, in the comparison to norms module, a
graphically-based comparison of key parameters
which are representative of typical values for
threat or non-threat, is presented. A series of
color-coded “chips” indicates whether each pa-
rameter value is a “fit,” is unknown, or is a “mis-
fit” with the typical values indicative of the two
threat assessment categories (i.e., threat, non-
threat). An additional feature is the ability to have
the specific  parameter values displayed by sliding
the cursor over the parameter of interest. For ex-
ample, as shown in Figure 6, when EW emitter is
selected, information similar to the following ap-
pears: “EW emitter verified as Cyrano IV, associ-
ated with F-1 aircraft. Threat:  Exocet.” This is
essentially what a full EW report would consist
of. The advantage here is that no communications
are required between the CO or TAO and the EW
operator, which saves both time and cognitive
overhead. The information is readily available just
by sliding the cursor over any of the eight pa-
rameters included in this module. Having instant
access to specific parametric information, as it
dynamically changes over the course of the sce-
nario, at no “cost” to the user, allows the deci-
sionmaker to spend more time attending to critical
cues and thus to maintain a more current and ac-
curate situational awareness. In these high work-
load, time-compressed scenarios the decision-
maker would, in many cases, not have time to re-
quest this information. However, subjects reported
that they liked having ready access to this data
without having to ask for it. Acquiring and main-
taining situation awareness becomes increasingly
difficult as the complexity and dynamics of the
situation increase. When the status of several
tracks is constantly changing, often in complex
ways, “a major portion of the operator’s job be-
comes that of obtaining and maintaining good
situation awareness” (Endsley, 1995, p. 33).
Another way the DSS was used to maintain
situation awareness is illustrated by the way a
CO/TAO used the system. When the CO heard the
TAO issue the order for a warning to be given, he
looked at the track history module and he could
immediately see why. Again, time and cognitive
overhead are saved by negating the need for these
two decisionmakers to communicate about these
types of decisions.
Research on problem solving has shown that
the way a specific problem is presented can de-
termine how the problem is solved.  Modules
within the DSS were designed to have a synergis-
tic effect. For example, the information contained
in the track profile (what’s going on with a track)
and the response manager (what to do about it)
create a holistic picture of the situation. The syn-
ergism results from having these two decision
support modules share the range scale and the
moving pointer. The moving pointer indicates
where the track is relative to the kinematic and
weapons’ information (altitude, track history,
track weapon’s envelope, own-ship’s weapon’s
coverage) presented in the track history module as
well as the recommended actions to be taken pre-
sented in the response manager module.
5  Future Research
Many of the recommendations made by subjects
in the initial evaluation of the DSS have been in-
corporated along with additional features the re-
search team anticipates will enhance perfor-
mance. The next phase of the TADMUS program
will empirically evaluate the DSS II. These rec-
ommendations include the following: (1) integra-
tion of the geoplot with the DSS screen; (2) use of
a touch screen to interact with the DSS (thereby
making interaction with the system as easy as pos-
sible in contrast to other systems that require
many complex steps to access informa-tion); (3)
increasing the number of tracks included in the
threat priority listing from 10 to 18; (4) adding a
relative position indicator, as an inset, to indicate
whether the ship has to maneuver to engage; (5)
adding a shadow along the coast to indicate the
12-nautical mile limit for territorial airspace; (6)
presenting additional layers of information via
various maps that can be accessed by the user to
depict information such as geopolitical bounda-
ries, atmospheric effects, population densities, de-
pending on the ship’s mission; (7) track priority
listing has been converted to include a quick ac-
cess bar to make accessing additional information
for a specific track easier as well as the use of ad-
ditional color coding to provide more information
in the  limited space; (8) adding the capability to
tailor the various actions (and the recommended
times for taking them) included in the response
manager to an individual user’s preference; (9)
use of color coding to distinguish historical in-
formation from current information in several
modules; (10) time of the last alert is presented
terms of how old the alert is (in minutes) versus
the time it occurred (so no conversion is neces-
sary); (11) the method of adjusting the range has
changed dramatically in that it is no longer limited
to changes in multiples of 2 (i.e., 16, 32, 64, etc.).
Now the user presses the zoom button until the
desired scale is achieved. Additionally, the user
can pan around within a range scale instead of
going through the additional step of off-centering
the ship’s position to enable the user to focus on a
particular area of the display.
Many other research issues remain. Plans in-
clude testing the complementary roles of the DSS
and training in critical thinking. Critical thinking
is a form of critiquing the currently held threat
assessment to ensure one hasn’t succumbed to
cognitive biases (Freeman & Cohen, 1996). Criti-
cal thinking is needed when pattern recogni-tion
does not work; it involves training decision-
makers to create, test, and evaluate stories to make
sense of observations and to explain conflicting
data, and finding alternative interpretations of
events. An experiment will be conducted to ex-
amine whether practice and feedback provided by
the DSS (using a modified version of the basis for
assessment module) enhances training.
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